This paper employs a hybrid actor-network theory/phenomenological approach to
Introduction
Being disabled requires a lot of paperwork. As if bigotry, poverty and problem architecture weren't trouble enough, filling out bureaucratic forms is an essential part of (Western) disabled existence. Here I want to frame this frequent nuisance as a site of what Annemarie Mol calls 'ontological politics', "a politics that has to do with the way in which problems are framed, bodies are shaped, and lives are pushed and pulled in one way or another " (2002:viii) .
I do so using two theoretical perspectives: phenomenology and actor-network theory (ANT). ANT helps us ask about the sociomaterial organization of disablement, how it emerges in and through life's passages (Moser & Law 1999 , Winance 2006 , Schillmeier 2010 .
It also gives us a theory of paperwork. Phenomenology helps us ask questions about disabled embodiment, and the experience of its sociomaterial distribution (Toombs 1995 , Titchkosky 2011 , Abrams 2013 ). In pursuing this line of questioning, this paper proceeds in three stages. First, I briefly outline the two theoretical traditions introduced above, outlining their common interest in disability and disablement, and their distance from a third approach, the so-called 'social model of disability'. Next, I introduce two different disability forms, the T2201 Disability Tax Credit Certificate (Canada 2012) , and the Ontario Disability Support Program application package (Ontario 2012) . The impetus for this project was my own experience of being 'filled in' to the T2201. While each form has varying aims and content, together they demonstrate the pervasiveness and the importance of examining the bureaucratic 'form of life' (Wittgenstein 2001a) . I conclude this paper discussing the ontological politics of disability and bureaucracy more generally, and establish some questions for further work on disability, its management, and the 'political economy of personhood' more generally (Abrams 2014d) .
Three Theoretical Traditions
This section introduces the phenomenological and ANT approaches to disablement. Both of these approaches have been formulated as reactions to the 'social model of disability', an historical materialist model that sees disablement as the outcome of barriers excluding disabled persons (Oliver 1986 ). The social model is at once an academic model used to study disability, and forms the basis of many policy approaches to disability, emphasizing barrier removal to promote full participation in society (as in the World Health Organization's ICIHD2 definition of disability; see Barnes 2000) . A short introduction to the social model will help give us the lay of the land, and highlight the contributions of subsequent work.
Born of 1970s and 1980s UK disability politics, the social model of disability rests on a definitional divide between impairment, biological maladies facing disabled persons, and disability, arbitrary social exclusion faced by those with impairments.
1 Disability studies as an activist discipline is charged with highlighting the social oppression faced by disabled persons. The historically emergent 'ideology of individualism', reproduced in and through capitalist social relations, causally misattributes exclusion to impairment, when it is in fact oppressive social structures that do the excluding. Capitalism "demanded nothing less than the ideological construction of the individual" (Oliver 1990:44) . Medicalization, too, causally misattributes exclusion to problem bodies, not problem social organization: "tragedy theory has served to individualise [sic] the problems of disability and hence to leave social and economic structures untouched" (Oliver 1986:16) . Social model disability research is 'emancipatory research' (Barnes 1996 (Barnes , 2003 , highlighting In departing from the social model of disability, I am not arguing that it is a useless or antiquated approach to disablement-far from it. Oliver's examination of the OPCS surveys is quite similar to that which I will pursue below. Further, the social model's policy implications are undeniably pertinent to these two cases. Let me be clear: if they are to be of use to disabled persons, all disability forms must understand the problem of extra-personal barriers.
But there is surely more to life as a disabled person than the experience of barriers.
3 By looking to phenomenology and ANT, and recasting disability as a materially-situated way of being-in-theworld, I want to ask how lives get included in governing practices, how disability is made meaningful therein. This does not mean that we cannot ask critical questions about these modes of inclusion, but it does mean that we need to add more voices to the choir. In so doing, I seek to supplement, rather than replace, the social model of disability. The two voices I add will be those of ANT and
Phenomenology. I deal with the latter first. Not only does text obscure its origin, it also obscures that of its objects: 'disabled Canadians' are described in texts outside of the often-lacking material environments in which they dwell. In this way, policy documents depoliticize disability from a problem that we can do something about-to a normal, natural situation outside of oriented human action. Disability is seen as a premade state of marginal existence, rather than an outcome of (often but not always exclusionary) social organization.
Others still use the work of existential phenomenologist Martin
Heidegger, to discuss how disability emerges in the course of daily life (Schillmeier 2008 , Abrams 2013 , 2014b . For Heidegger (1992 Heidegger ( , 1996 , the times-and-spaces closest to human existence (Dasein) are not those of the measuring tape and the clock, but in the 'over there' of the nearby book, and the way we throw ourselves into future tasks (what Heidegger calls moments of care). In medical practice, social service provision, or any other administrative structure, disability is 'enframed', carved from this primordial state of being and brought to presence as an orderable and manageable thing, rather than a state of Dasein (Heidegger 1993 Heidegger calls the 'ontological difference ' (1996:211) .
Phenomenological approaches to disability differ from the social model's formulation of disability, in that they believe the impairment/disability dichotomy, just like its mind/body cousin, does not accurately represent the cultural production and personal experience of disablement. ANT approaches to disablement, by contrast, take issue with the UPIAS' founding distinction between things 'natural' and things 'social', in this case disability and impairment.
5
In this move, ANT is not picking on emancipatory disability studies in isolation; its theorists oppose any research enterprise that would hypostatize 'the social' as a causal agent. Latour (2004) Here ANT shares the social model's environmental focus, but it does not use the language of social oppression in that task.
'The social' is not the site of Liv's exclusion; it is a description of the material passages where disability is made present, albeit for a fleeing moment. To say, like Oliver, that "disability is a socially constructed category" is not to say very much at all (Hacking 1999 Freund (2001) and Gleeson (1999) .
the view of disability as an organizational consequence. In sum, disability "is a set of specificities-which means, to be sure, that we might imagine ourselves as abled, but abled in a million ways. Just as Liv is dis/abled in a million ways" (p. 200).
Born of empirical laboratory studies (Latour & Woolgar 1979 , Latour 1987 , ANT has emphasized 'the textual' since its origin. In Laboratory Life (1979), Latour and Woolgar document the process through which nature is inscribed, brought to paper in scientific practice.
Science is made possible by 'writing nature' (Asdal & Ween 2014) , by putting to paper the 'trials of strength' where scientific objects are given the opportunity to defy our descriptions of them. In his "Visualization and Cognition" (1986), Latour extends this argument.
What is particular about the history of Western science is not a new mind, that "suddenly emerged sometime in the sixteenth century" Instead of talking of merchants, princes, scientists, astronomers and engineers as having some sort of relation with one another, it seems to me it would be more productive to talk about 'centers of calculation'.
[…] There is not a history of engineers, then a history of capitalists, then one of mathematicians, then one of economists. Rather, there is a single history of these centers of calculation (Latour 1986:32 ).
Latour's goals were to trace modern history through inscription practices. 6 This project is extremely ambitious. Mine is not. In what follows, I want to document how disability is shaped through accountability to bureaucratic categories. To be disabled is to be mapped, charted, poked-and-prodded-and then: inscribed.
Bureaucratic forms establish passages against which we must read our lives, and the lives of others. They are places where Dasein is delivered to objective presence, where lives are made and remade in materially equipped activity. As I show in the following section, they are places where ANT and phenomenology can work together. 6 Latour (1993) quickly dropped the word 'modern' from his vocabulary.
Bureaucratic Forms of Life
The title to this paper is more than simply a bad pun at In each setting where a bureaucratic form is used, I want to argue, 7 Here I follow a long line of philosophers who would read Wittgenstein phenomenologically. For three examples, see Guignon (1990) , Overgaard (2006) , and Rorty (1993) .
it entrants participate in the production of disability's meaning in a materially equipped fashion, the very stuff of ontological politics. Impairments must also be 'prolonged', they must have "lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of 12 months" (Ibid.). In these criteria, we find the form to be a textbook case of 'medicalization', as per Oliver's (1990) formulation. The doctor performs the 8 Here 'entrants' is used both to refer to those participating in formal entry, and the entity so entered. In the T2201 Disability Tax Certificate (Canada 2012) , for instance, this involves medical practitioner, applicant and their disability status. 9 Exchanged at 5.7587 NOK to $1 CAD. 10 For a detailed discussion of tax policy as Canadian social policy, and the Disability Tax Credit's place therein, see Prince (2001) . Prince suggests that while tax policy has been a common government instrument to address disability issues, it leaves much to be desired. Uptake is low, the DTC only applies to taxes owed, and schemes like the Medical Expense Tax Credit only reimburse medical expenses paid, failing to attend to the needs of many disabled Canadians and their families. 11 Qualification entails a professional designation related to the impairments at hand. can both be medicalized, but bring the data to accounts in wildly different ways. The goal should not be to figure out if activities are, in fact, medical or not, but to "catch the work of fact production in flight" (Garfinkel 1967:79) , to see how disability is delivered to the purview of medical professionals and to document what is lost in transit. This project is not opposed to Oliver's views on medicalization, but extends his abstract critique to the production and allocation of both disabled and able-bodied personhood.
In the T2201, for example, physical disability is treated as purely somatic malfunction, objective lack possessed by a problem body, rather than as a mode of Dasein disclosed in care. Everyday tasks as translated to purely mechanistic modes of body function rather than as a way of being. Consider restriction in walking.
Your patient is considered markedly restricted in walking if, all or substantially all of the time, he or she is unable or requires an inordinate amount of time to walk even with appropriate therapy, medication, and devices.
[…]
Examples of marked restriction in walking (examples are not exhaustive):
Your patient must always rely on a wheelchair, even for short distances outside the home. conditions, with the exception of those "conditions that have been resolved or are not current or are not ongoing within the last year".
To this effect, 'Lung Cancer -Shortness of Breath' are provided as examples. On the following page, Restrictions are divided into three columns: restriction, duration, prognosis; "cannot walk more than 3 blocks before having to stop", "is expected to last one year or more and is continuous," and "is likely to deteriorate" is provided.
The ODSP application provides more than an opportunity for a boring, second hand description of an immutable mobile: it asks that we critically review both the social model's deep-seated impairment/disability dualism and its embodied phenomenological if we focus on the division between disability and impairment, we miss the problematic, objectively present ontology on which those two terms are predicated.
This is particularly important when we look to restricted mental capacity. Here we can turn to the ADL, required for any successful application, seeking "to describe the impact of the impairment on the applicant's ability to attend to his or her personal care, function in the community and function in the workplace" (p.
12). The index consists of twenty-six questions, and restrictions are ranked from Class 1, "Within normal limits OR not applicable"
to Class 4, "Severe or complete limitations on most occasions to completion of the task" (Ibid). I will not list the questions in their entirety here, only those that address mental 'function in the community'. These are:
(1) Orientation to time, person and place.
14 Recall the social model divides disability into impairment (medical conditions facing individual persons) and disability (as social exclusion).
(2) Recognizes within normal limits the common dangers in the home, workplace or community. were a more just and effective system to replace the status quo, it would have to overcome the systematic bias against persons with the 'wrong' kinds of disabilities-'wrong' because they cannot be easily inscribed according to the ontology of objective presence.
Finally, a note on the political economy of personhood: I have used this awkward phrase to talk about the social and material conditions in which humans are recognized as such. I use these terms instead of 'subjectivity' for the following reasons. First, subjectivity smacks of a very isolated, disembodied epistemological knower that phenomenologists have sought out to discredit. The epistemological subject-objective world relationship fails to capture the experience of Dasein. Secondly, however awful the phrase may be, the political economy of personhood implies a process.
'Subjectivity' implies a pre-existing state of affairs; we are always subjects capable of experience. In my use, personhood is manufactured, organized, categorized and assembled. None of these regimes can fully capture Dasein-nor should they-but they help to show the way disabled being is enframed in societies organized through bureaucratic activity. It is a first step towards a disabled phenomenology (Abrams 2014d) , one that takes human difference as its point of departure, rather than an abstract, ahistorical and always-able ideal consciousness. Analyzing bureaucratic forms is one small step in this greater journey. Both of these problems are derivative of the more fundamental problem of the ontological difference. As a whole, the bureaucratic paperwork points us to the realities of living as a disabled person in the West, a small step towards a philosophy that takes embodied difference as its point of departure, rather than its limits.
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